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TOWARDS THE MODERN HISTORY OF ETHIOPIA I 
THE SO-CALLED "CIVILIZING MISSION"
by Richard Greenfield*
The works of a very motley few notwithstanding, 
comparatively little has so far been written on the 
modern history of Ethiopia. In all probability this 
is at least in part because Ethiopia's struggle against 
the territorial imperialism of Europe has been markedly 
different from the experience of other African countries 
even if her other experiences may not have been so uni­
que as is sometimes supposed. Nevertheless Ethiopia is 
an African Empire and the modern history of Ethiopia is 
as vital to an 'African Overview' as modern histories 
of the struggles of indigenous peoples elsewhere on this 
continent. This paper is the first of, hopefully, a 
series in which the writer, will seek to make some little 
contribution to the work of Africanists and Ethiopicists 
by an attempt at vigorous examination of those writings 
which will have to be taken into account as possible 
source materials for that definitive study of modern 
Ethiopian history which is yet to be penned.
As far as Africa is concerned the Second World War 
began in 1935 - the fact that Britain joined in in 1939 
and the Soviet Union and the United States in 1941 is 
incidental to the dates of the war, however profound the 
effects of the widening of the battlefields. Soon the 
1930's and 40's, currently discussed as 'international 
affairs' will be incorporated into the African History 
text books used in the classrooms and colleges of this 
continent and teachers will be on the lookout for back­
ground reading. One book they may be tempted to turn 
to is "The Civilizing Mission', a recently published 
work by A.J. Barker1, which describes the international
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ferment which preceded the Italian Fascist invasion 
of Ethiopia (Abyssinia) 1935-6, and the invasion itself. 
Colonel Barker, an Englishman, has some first hand 
experience of Ethiopia and a sound military background 
from which to draw. Moreover he guides his reader 
through the tortuous political negotiations and deals 
of the '30’s with considerable narrative skill. But 
his book - as its cover proclaims - is popular history.
It is drawn in the main from secondary sources and if 
composed with a lively pen, it nevertheless suffers 
from the usual defects of popular history - errors are 
multitude and the relevant and available sources are by 
no means exhausted.
Barker's study begins with a six page "Timetable 
of a War" - the sequence of events in summary from 
November 23, 193^ through November 3, 1938. This is 
a useful reference frame, though it should be noted that 
Italian troops, anticipating orders, had entered Ethio­
pia in the torrid Danakil desert region near the volcano 
Musa Ali before October 3rd, 1935 and that Makalle was 
occupied by DeBono1s forces only once - in November and 
not on October 7th of that year.
Some account of the Wal-Wal incident which sparked 
the conflagration is given. Italian troops were found 
in a fortified camp within Ethiopia and fighting ensued 
at the end of 193^ • This discovery was made by a joint 
Anglo-Ethiopian Boundary Commission working in the area. 
The Ethiopians were very incensed and correctly fearing 
trouble, the British withdrew. Such was the bravery of 
the Ethiopian soldiers that they tried to overturn an 
Italian armoured car with their bare hands - however, 
they had eventually to withdraw having suffered heavy 
casualties. It is interesting to note that Barker (6 ) 
states that Fitorari Shiferra was "The officer commanding 
the Ethiopian escort". Certainly Italian Memoranda to 
the League of Nations at the time assert "A body of 
Abyssinian troops commanded by the Fitourari Shiferra 
attacked the Italian garrison ' but G. Steer in Caesar in 
Abyssinia who was correspondent of the London Times wrote
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"The Ethiopian command were entirely 
unprepared. Their chief Fitorari 
Alemayu was shot down leaving his 
tent in the first five minutes..."
Shiferra, Steer states, was in fact the second-in- 
command and, he asserts - and here the account becomes 
even more detailed - since he sold his cartriges and 
fled to Ji-Jigga, a muslim Ethiopian, Ali Nur, actually 
took command. Barker's account is not dissimilar except 
that he states that the early casualty was the second- 
in-command. A footnote to his source might have helped 
clear up the discrepancy he introduces. Two other small 
points are that Dejazmatch (or Dejiak, an alternative 
usage in later parts of the book for this feudal title) 
is not absolutely synonymous with Governor. Literally 
'Marshal of the (Provincial) Headquarters', it is a 
feudal-military title rather than an appointment - a 
Ras could equally well be a governor. Also the Wal-Wal 
fort was not the creation of the colonial Commandatore 
but was rebuilt from the ruins of one of Muhammad 
Abdille Hassan's defence works.
Barker correctly interprets Wal-Wal as the pre­
text rather than the root cause of the war and he 
therefore essays into the historical background. He 
properly observes of "Abyssinia" that "the two most 
important parts were Tigre... and Shoa" yet his map 
opposite (pages 16 and 17) fails to mark Shoa (Shewa).
Also an extensive area of Highland Ethiopia is shaded 
as "the original Solomonid Kingdoms of the Habash" 
whatever that might mean. On the same page Kassa, who 
was to become the Emperor Yohannes, is described as 
Ras, a title which he never assumed. Nor was Emperor 
Tewodros his immediate predecessor. Any historical 
summary inevitably over-simplifies events, but even if 
we can pass "the death of Gordon led to the withdrawal 
of all British troops from the Sudan" (1 9) we can never 
accept that with the death of Yohannes "Menelik of Shoa 
became the strongest claimant to the throne of Tigre" (20) 
The strongest claimant was Mangasha, Yohannes1 son, and
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Menelik had no claim whatsoever.
At the end of the nineteenth century the Italians 
sought to establish a protectorate over Ethiopia by an 
interpretation of the treaty of Wachile (Uccialli).
How ’honest’ they were has been argued in the Journal 
of African History, to a degree indeed that one wonders 
how accessible the relevant archives are - and to whom! 
Barker does not quite get Menelik’s rejection of this 
status across to the reader with enough force - extracts 
from some of the Emperor’s other correspondence with 
the Khalifa or the powers of Europe might have helped. 
Menelik,, let it be noted like Tewodros and Yohannes 
before him, understood the menace and the methods of 
European territorial imperialism. In 1891* Menelik 
warned that ”if powers at a distance come forward to 
partition Africa between them I do not intend to be an 
indifferent spectator” - and that in a letter to the 
rulers of Europe. ’Ethiopia needs the protection of 
no one” he once commented and, quoting the scriptures, 
added ’’Ethiopia stretches her hand (only) to God”.
Barker describes how General Baldissera, Italian 
colonial governor of Eritrea then argued that Italy had 
to regard Menelik as an opponent. True, but in fact 
the former’s dispatches reveal that he had come to that 
conclusion well before Menelik rejected these protectorate 
claims - one does not have to be over-sensitive to the 
frequent distortions of Africa’s past to protest when 
such consistent rejection is described as ’’increasing 
truculence” (22).
There is, of course, more to the Ethiopian defeat 
of the Italians at the Battle of Adowa in 1896 than 
Barker has space to tell, particularly from the Ethio­
pian side. 1935-6 and World War apart, it marked a 
halt in the scramble for Africa, but nevertheless 
Barker succeeds in demonstrating its immense psycholo­
gical influence on both contestants. It left Ethiopia 
the sole surviving fragment of ’independent Africa - 
subsequently to be discussed as a pawn in European
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sphere of influence" politics - and such discussions 
were not just "arrogant examples of pre-19l4 imperial­
istic diplomacy" (27) for Barker himself describes, 
similar discussion much later - in the times of Haile 
Sellassie. The war of 1935 was an imperialist exercise - 
as the preposterous phase used in the title of Barker's 
book illustrates - and future historians will very 
likely see it as a late but integral part of the 
scramble.
The setting of the scene also leads Barker into 
an assessment of the state of Ethiopia prior to the 
Italian invasion. The word 'Abyssinia' is not derived 
from the arabic for "a number of races" but from an 
early immigrant group (33). Nor is it correct to write 
"before the Italians came along most of the tips of the 
primitive wooden instruments used for cultivation were 
not shod with iron and the ploughs were merely crooked 
sticks". (39) The Ethiopian Orthodox Christian Church 
is not well described as "a branch of the Coptic Sect"(4l), 
There is no sound evidence that the Emperor Eyasu became 
a Muslim convert (44) - although it was in the interests 
of the British, the French, the Italians and of Imperial 
Russia to so paint him. Nor did the young Haile Sellassie 
actually go to school at the French Catholic Mission in 
Harar (4-5) - he was tutored. Also one wonders what the 
evidence is for Barker's claim that the history of 
Afghanistan had a great effect on Haile Sellassie's 
mental growth (4^ and 49). Other writers, such as 
Geoffrey Harmsworth in Abyssinia Marches On (London, 1931) 
have made the same claim but none appears to substantiate 
it.
On the credit side, however, Barker has no illusions 
about the state of Ethiopian Feudalism, and despite the 
blemishes listed, some of his descriptions of the plight 
of the disease-ridden and oppressed peasantry, the exist­
ence of forms of slavery and slave traffic, the strength 
of the Church and the nobility and the weakness of the 
central government, are accurate and erudite. He writes 
of the early struggle of the youthful Haile Sellassie 
then known as Tafari Makonnen against much of the heavy
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tradition of Ethiopia - perhaps the little Emperor’s 
finest hour - and he crucially concludes by placing 
Ethiopia in the then international setting.
He writes that
Min 193^ Ethiopia was at the end of a 
phase of her development”
and the attitudes and actions of the outside world,
clearly determined that this was so. He perhaps over­
states his case a little when he continues
"the mutual jealousies of her powerful 
and predatory neighbours had allowed 
her to continue an independent exist­
ence for a long time”,
but it was vitally true that
”when one of them, with the connivance
of the others, decided that her fruit
was ripe for plucking, only military 
and economic strength could have saved 
her. As she had neither, her days of 
independence were numbered”.
In the next two chapters (pages 5^-1^3) Barker 
summarizes the cruel bartering which led to the abandon­
ment of Ethiopia by her supposed potential alies in what 
proved a vain hope to preserve the peace of Europe. The 
character and attitude of the important figures of the 
period are sketched with a directness that is appealing. 
Mussolini is seen not only as consistent but also as 
well informed - even secret information from the British 
Embassy was apparently available to him. Barker maintains 
that the Vatican was 'bought (off)... comparatively 
cheaply” (6 7) in a manner which he provokingly brackets 
with the Duce’s bribery of the Ethiopian Rases (66).
Pius XI, he firmly asserts was "biased toward fascism". 
Most Ethiopians certainly believe that, but it has 
seldom been so openly stated elsewhere.
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Barker also understands the motives and particular
the attitudes of moral supremacy which so strengthened
Europe's imperialism - but he is less convincing either 
when he dismisses the consistent Soviet opposition to 
the Duce's adventure in militaristic imperialism as 
merely cynical opportunism not at all conditioned by 
ideological considerations; or when he.suggests that 
Japan supported Ethiopia for her own purposes without 
any reference to the sympathy she felt for a sister non­
white empire; or when he deals with Ethiopia herself.
He writes that Ethiopia "persistently adopted a disdain­
ful attitude towards Italy's right to preferential treat 
ment in the matter of concessions,,." But Ethiopians 
never recognized such "rights". Most Ethiopians whose 
horizons permitted discussion and speculation on such 
issues did not even recognize Italy's colonizer status 
in Eritrea. As the northern Ras Alula had put this in 
the previous century, such claims would only be recogni­
zed by such as he "when he was governor in Rome". 
"Ethiopia's frontier is the sea^ he had declared.
Barker interestingly comments on the amount of 
"Italian activity inside.. Ethiopia" just prior to the 
war and this point might have been worth developing.
In 1925 General Virgin, a trusted Swedish advisor to 
the Emperor, wrote, "During recent years Italy had 
installed in Abyssinia a crowd of consuls and agents 
commerciaux in places where there was not a single 
Italian or any good reason for their presence".^ That 
this was allowed is surely as much to the point as the 
belated complaint that Barker records Haile Sellassie 
making about it at Geneva. The historian must ask was 
Ethiopia betrayed? Were some of her leaders bought?
The history of !collaboration'is a difficult and'still 
touchy subject even after a quarter of a century, but 
it must be remembered that Dejazmatch Haile Sellassie 
Gugsa, for instance, soon afterwards did betray the 
centre of the Ethiopian line when he deflected, to all 
intents and purposes at the opening of hostilities in 
his home area. Captured secret Italian documents
27.
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it, but by 193  ^such action might also have led to 
intervention by a consortium of the colonial powers 
of Europe "in the interests of peace". Haile Sellas­
sie certainly placed "too much faith in the League of 
Nations" (112) but his alternatives in the area of 
resisting colonialism were very few. One factor which 
Barker does not bring out is that for the Emperor to 
have agreed to any of the mooted transfers of territory 
would have involved controvening his coronation oath 
and that would probably .have led to his deposition by 
an already critical and conservative nobility.
As the "war clouds gather" (chapter 7) some lack 
of consistency in Barker's account emerges. Of Hoare, 
the British Foreign Secretary, Barker comments (he)
"sadly misjudged the Duce. The extent of the futility 
of trying to bluff a gambler like Mussolini (particularly 
when the latter had access to information in the British 
Embassy in Rome) is perhaps more apparent now than it 
was in 1935" and he later says of the possibility of 
British naval intervention in the Mediterranean and per­
haps Suez, "Britain had the cards in her right hand all 
right: but courage was lacking in Whitehall and Musso­
lini knew it". But later (l8l), and in contrast, he 
writes "The Duce was by no means certain that the 
British were going to refrain from active interference 
in his adventure..." One suspects the former inter­
pretation is more correct. However, Barker’s conclusion 
is sound: Ethiopia was doomed.
Haile Sellassie had ordered all Ethiopian forces 
to withdraw many miles from all frontiers, but never­
theless Count Aloisi could report to the Council of the 
League of Nations that "the warlike and aggressive 
spirit of Ethiopia... (was) imposing war" on Italy, (1V5) 
and the Italo-Ethiopian war of 1935 began.
Barker’s account of the invasion, the subsequent 
campaign and the occupation of Ethiopia, is perhaps the 
weakest part of the work, not only because of the usual 
crop of errors, but also because, apart from Haile 
Sellassie and one or two feudal chieftains, the Ethiopian
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Apart from the endpapers there are ten maps support­
ing the text, many of which are based on those published 
by the Italian. Commanders. The important river boundary 
between Ethiopia and Eritrea is marked as the Mared (16 9) 
instead of Mareb. Cartographic reference to the forces 
of "Dejiak Damteu" (286) is ambiguous and misleading. 
Damteu--a Fitwrari not a Dejazmatch-- died at Adowa in . 
1896, Both his sons, Ras Desta and Dejazmatch Abebe, 
were important figures in Ethiopian resistance in the 
south, but confusion with the father’s name, probably 
caused by Barker’s alien concept of surnames (which in 
another context lessens the usefulness of the index) 
leaves it unclear which of these leaders is meant. Also 
there is a map titled "Italian East Africa" (302) which 
fails to illustrate the most significant fact that the 
Italians attempted to rule all the Somali areas as one 
unit. Indeed the frontier shown by Barker was neither 
demarcated nor recognized by the Italians and this 
important fact was the very pretext for the whole "civil­
izing mission". This error is as serious as the previously 
noted omission of Shoa, the very focus of the Ethiopian 
Empire-State.
The summary of the war in these chapters is no 
improvement on Steer - a brilliant writer - and Barker 
can be very misleading. For instance, Ras Desta is 
described as having escaped with a Belgian - his "army 
of the southwest no longer existed as a fighting force 
and Desta himself was not seen or heard of again until 
the end of the war". After the defeat of the southern 
armies Ras Desta in fact continued the fight leading 
significant Patriot forces in the company of Dejazmatch 
Gabre Mariam and Tadema Zelleka but was captured and 
shot. Photographs of his mutilated body were used in 
a vain attempt to cow the forces of the resistance, and 
this became a cause cel^bre. Barker's error could have 
been avoided had use been made of Miss Sylvia Pankhurst’s 
New Times and Ethiopia News or later summaries in the 
Ethiopia Observer Vol. Ill, pp. 10-12 and Vol. IV, p.l 
(London, 1999-60)} or an article by your reviewer 
Remembering the Struggle', Makerere Journal, Vol. IX,
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1964, subsequently developed into chapter 13* 'The 
Patriots' in Ethiopia - a New Political History 
(London and New York 1965). Nor, in this context, 
does Barker's quite extensive bibliography even list 
Angelo Del Boca, La Guerra d' Abissinia, 1935-41,
(Milan, 19 6 5) which more recently has been translated 
into English by P.D. Cummins as The Ethiopian War 
1979-41 (London and Chicago 19697-
Since the publisher claims that Barker's discussion 
of this 'notorious war' is 'the most comprehensive' then 
he invites close examination. This follows. War drums 
in Ethiopia were not used to relay messages in the 
manner of the talking drums of West Africa (p.l45); not 
all Ethiopians considered themselves the sons of Solomon 
(p.l47); it was Haile Sellassi'e's civil leaders not his 
'advisors", who drew their strength from his ideas (p.l47) 
it is quite untrue that "considerations of fire power, 
mobility and aircraft just did not interest" the Ethio­
pians (p.147) for Haile Sellassie had used airplanes in 
1930 against Gugsa Wolie. But the world ganged up against 
Ethiopia in 1935 to obstruct any application of their 
interest in modern weaponry. "Amharan tribesmen" (p.151) 
would be better rendered just "Amhara" and "Gojjams' as 
"Gojamis" (p.304) and it begs a lot of questions to write 
of 1935 that "in three decades the Ethiopian feudal system 
had degenerated". Dr. Workneh Martin (p.152) was of 
Ethiopian descent and not an Anglo-Indian. What is meant 
by the reference "the Duce's generals were old men, men 
molded by the past, whose personal recollections included 
Adowa and the tragic fate of Baratieri?" (p.155) General 
Baratieri, Italian Governor of Eritrea, escaped from the 
battlefield of Adowa. Haile Sellassie's daughter married 
to Haile Sellassie Gugsa, died prematurely but not from 
the attentions of "witch doctors" (p.16 5) - that term is 
not applicable in Tigre - even to debteras. Barker is 
entitled to his opinion that "Ethiopians were not of the 
same calibre as the fierce hillmen of India" but probably 
he is unwise, in view of so many instances of almost 
incredible courage recorded by the Italians, to be so 
dogmatic (17 0). The statue of the Lion taken by the
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Italians which Barker reports they "are inclined to 
hint that they could find... but have no intention of 
seeing it returned to Ethiopia" (174) was actually 
returned long ago - perhaps he is thinking of the 
Aksumite Stele, still corroding in the air of indus­
trial Rome, near the arch of Constantine. There is 
little evidence to suggest that Ras Hailu was "one of * 
the best fighting chiefs of Ethiopia". He was over 
sixty and more renowned for intrigue than warfare.
Haile Sellassie's conversation with Colonel Konovaloff, 
referred to at the beginning of chapter 14, took place 
in 1936, not 1935. The Abuna was not Patriarch of the 
Ethiopian Church in 1936. The quotations from Konovaloff 
(273) are considerably paraphrased and condensed from 
the original although presented as direct quotations.
Ras Seyoum did not leave Ethiopia with Haile Sellassie 
and Ras Kassa, but remained and was salaried by the 
Italians, as was Ras Hailu. Several of the Patriot 
leaders who were "horrified at the collapse of France" 
and who had "believed France was the first military 
power in Europe" were educated at Saint Cyr not just 
at Djibouti (^ 24).
If the campaigns are not well described, Barker’s 
chapters on the failure of the ineffective sanction 
measures adopted by the League are interesting. This 
incidentally is an area in which the greatest portion 
of recent scholarly work has been concentrated. Barker 
includes many interesting photographs, but misses this 
opportunity to adequately present the unique and difficult 
terraine of Ethiopia. There are useful appendices and a 
useful select bibliography, but the notes are scrappy.
If the average standard of indexing in recent 
Ethiopica is admittedly low, Barker plumbs new depths.^
3. In general the indexing of works on Ethiopia .leaves 
much to be desired and some, like the U.S. Army area 
Handbook for Ethiopia have none at all. It is a sad 
reflection on the funds that academic workers are able 
to attract, that the ’civilian' version of this quite 
comprehensive survey, G. Lipsky (editor) Ethiopia, Its 
Peoples, Its Society, Its Culture, (New Haven 1962)
(Cont.)
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An index is a vital tool for the serious historian: 
in the hope that frank discussion of such shoddyness 
will prevent repetition, let us risk some tediousness 
in close examination.
Alagi, Aradam and Augher are listed under Amba, 
the Amharic for a mountain with a flatlsh summit, 
which is like listing Kilimanjaro, Everest and Good­
win Austin under Mount. Aradam is also separately 
listed, but the entries do not tally. Mai Ceu, the 
most important battle of the war, although correct in 
the text, is misspelt 3 times in the Index. Consulting 
"Emperor of Ethiopia”, one is told ”see Haile Sellassie” 
but there were other Emperors, although for some reason 
Yohannes, anglicised as John, is wrongly listed as "King 
Tewodros, anglicised as Theodore, is listed as "Emperor 
but Eyasu - for consistency why not anglicised as Jesus 
- is listed under his title 1 Li j T. Similarly Walwal is 
anglicised but Uccialli is inconsistently left in the 
Italian usage. Entries under Haile Selassie, who 
incidentally spells his name Sellassie, do not include 
the pages before his coronation when he was known as 
Tafari Makonnen. Some of these are to be found, logic­
ally* under "Tafari, Ras" but others are under ’N",
Negus Tafari", that is to say under the Ethiopic for King".
The reader is unlikely to look up "Non-Amharic 
peoples" under "N" but might well be interested in 
Islam in Ethiopia, in which case he would have to 
consult Islam, Moors, Muslems and Muhammadans - and 
all entries are different. The Patriots, although 
mentioned in the text, are not listed, but "Fugitives 
Ethiopian" is an example of pointless listing. Dira
(Contd. from Footnote 3)
can be only an abbreviated version of a handbook 
produced to meet the needs of the United States 
Department of Defense. However Lipsky's edition 
does have an index - in which he succeeds in list­
ing several Ethiopians under A for A to which 
means MrJ
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Dawa is not mentioned on page 53 but the references to 
Churchill, Sir Winston might have included 313* Nor, 
as in places in the text, are Ethiopian names properly 
understood. The first name which Barker normally lists 
and uses is the important one. The second is normally 
the father's name and is not a surname, hence "Burru, 
Ayelu" should be under f,AM as should Damteu, Dejiak 
AbbebeM. "Fitorari Taferi" should be "Taferi, Fitorari" 
(a title) and worse the first reference (5 1-52) under 
’Gugsa, Ras" refers to Ras Gugsa Wolie who was unrelated 
to the other listings which refer to a quite different 
person, Dejazmatch Haile Sellassie Gugsa - who is also 
separately and correctly listed. "Harawiate, Teele" 
should be "Tekle Harawaite" under "T" and in the "W's" 
Wodaju’s father was Ali not Aiis and the next entry 
should read Wolde Mariam not Miriam. Shoa, the most 
important Province of Ethiopia, is meaninglessly listed 
as "Shoa, tribe of".w Danakil, country of and ’Dankalia" 
are separately and differently listed. Newspapers 
quoted are indexed but only the New York Times entry 
apparently merits the description "cited".
So much for what is contained in the book: but
discussion of its relevance for the modern historian 
demands a note also on what may not be found therein. 
Barker subtitles his The Civilizing Mission as "A 
History of the Italo-Ethiopian War 1935-1936". Perhaps 
"Campaign" would have been a better word. The Italo- 
Ethiopian War must be dated 1935-41 for, as the author 
recognises in his last two chapters entitled "The 
Occupation" and "Aftermath", Ethiopia was overrun rather 
than conquered in 1936. Haile Sellassie left for Dji­
bouti, Jerusalem and Europe where he made his historic 
personal appearance before the League of Nations, but 
that did not signify the end of the war to the Ethio­
pians and fighting continued.
ARTICLES 35.
Subsequently events within the Empire have been 
obscured by the justified emphasis that writers have 
given to Haile Sellassie's prophetic words at Geneva,
111 was defending the cause of all 
small peoples who are threatened by 
aggression. What have become of the 
promises that were made to me? . ..
God and History will remember your 
judgement"
World history has remembered - the world con­
science is still stunned by repetition of those sad 
words. Their relevance is indisputable. Millions 
died because they went unheeded. The hearts of the 
people of the world, though not immediately of their
governments, warmed towards the dignified and lonely
exiled Emperor. But the attention of the African 
Historian must not be distracted from afro-centric 
examination. Back in the mountains of Ethiopia, 
where few knew and fewer cared about Geneva, enthu­
siasm for their King of the Kings was not so marked.
It is perhaps relevant to repeat an earlier 
summary of collected oral evidence on this issue.
"One by one, the leaders and the 
people of the city of Addis Ababa 
and beyond heard the news. It fell
to Blatta Kidane Mariam to take the
news to Dejazmatch Fikre Mariam and 
Blatta Takele. Incredulous, they 
drove down, the bumpy 'murrum' road 
to the Akaki railway station and 
learnt that it was true. Takele, 
hot and dusty in his white dress, 
fell in a fit. 'My country there 
is no one to defend your cause’, he 
cried as they took him to the car.
ARTICLES 3 6 .
The shums (leaders) and priests of the 
villages despaired; never in their 
proud history had such a thing happened: 
that the ’Elect of God* should leave the 
chosen Ethiopian people for asylum in 
some foreign place”.4 j
Before his departure the Emperor appointed Ras Imru 
as Viceroy and when the latter’s forces were surrounded 
and he was obliged to give up the struggle, other leaders 
- Takale Wolde Hawariat, Balcha, Abebe Aragai, Geressa 
Duke, Desta and Ababe Damtew, Belai Zelleka, to list but 
a few, fought on as Patriot Commanders.
Just before a Commonwealth Army ended the occupation, 
General Bonacorsi, Inspector General of the Blackshirt 
forces in ’’Italian East Africa” wrote:
’’The assassination of our officers from 
April 19^9 until today has become a 
normal phenomenon. In the whole empire 
rebellion is latent and will have a tra­
gic end when, in case of war, hostilities 
begin. If from any of our frontiers a 
single British or French unit marches 
resolutely into our territory with its 
flag flying, it will not need armed men 
because the greater part of the Abyssinian 
people will join it and fight against us”.
Barker does imply this when he writes that ’’Musso­
lini’s jubilant proclamation announcing the founding of 
an Italian East African Empire ushered in little more 
than five years of incomplete military occupation" (3501) 
but he does not expand it. Once again a measure of con­
fusion exists, for after describing the link-up between 
Graziani's troops and those of Badoglio, in Dira Dawa,
4. R. Greenfield, Ethiopia - a New Political History, 
(London and New' York' 1965) page 223.
ARTICLES 37.
Barker can also write "so the war ended" (287). It 
did not. More work is needed on this period - in the 
field. But in this context it is very encouraging this 
year to find new work on the Patriots being published  ^
by Woizerit Salome Gabre Egziabher and Richard Pankhurst.
Barker's "Civilizing Mission" is popular history 
and that perhaps not at its best. Your reviewer's ex­
cuse for examining a popular work at such unusual length 
is to demonstrate and reiterate that the serious student 
of twentieth century African and Black history must 
demand - or better produce - real works of scholarship. 
Amateurs and journalists have helped, but they are no­
where near enough. The aim should be, not merely to 
clear the cobwebs from the minds of historians like 
Trevor Roper of Oxford, who persist in publishing snide 
comments of the story of man in Africa, but to fill a 
significant gap in the knowledge of human experience.
Work on contemporary African history, such as Professor 
Ajayi of Ibadan called for at the last International 
Africanists' Congress (Dakar, 19 6 7) could well begin, 
as far as Ethiopia is concerned, with more theses and 
papers on the still shadowy men and women who have played 
leading roles. An obvious example is Dejazmatch Takale 
Wolde Hawariat - perhaps the greatest Patriot of them 
all - who died by his own hand at the age of 78, late 
in 1969, when one of the several conspiracies with which 
he has been associated misfired. But he is not alone. 
Enough is not known of Dejazmatch Balcha, Habte Giorgis, 
Ras Alula, Lij Eyasu, Empress Zauditu, Ras Makonnen Endal- 
katchew, Belai Zelleke, Geressu Duke, Ras Abebe Aragai, 
and so many others. Meantime, we await a definitive 
history of the Ethio-Italian War.
5. "The Ethiopian Patriots 1936-41" and "The Ethiopian 
Patriots and the Collapse of Italian Rule in East 
Africa", Ethiopia Observer, Vol. XII, No.2, 1969.
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